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. the book centers on this incident which i described where u.s. special operators blocked hamid karzai's planned governor for kabul. she interweaves into it a very well-written and interestingly a history that is well-written, well-organized, and based on a lot of her own research with the original sources. a second really important understanding of the country can be gotten from joe haversty's book "the opium season" which details a year in which he was involved in as a subcontractor in the usaid efforts in 2 004-2005 to provide alternative livelihood's to draw with the work force from up opium production. it gives a great view of the violence and corruption. and moreover it shows the bureaucratic profiteering and dysfunction that is increasing the complexity and cost of our involvement, not just in war, but in development. a third source, and i think it is outstanding if you want to understand the country is rory stewart, who within weeks after the fall of the taliban walked to kabul in the winter which is supposed to kill you and through pashtun villages and described that experienc
about the cabinet picks, the selections of hamid karzai. cabinet crisis reveals karzai's weakening grasp. lawmakers unhappy with the president's pick. what is the concern over the choices? >> guest: president karzai has made two sets of choices. he nominated once slate of cabinet officials about 24 of them. seventeen were rejected by the parliament. the parliament in a healthy move is asserting itself. this is a good thing. have some balancing, checks and balances as we understand them. so the parliament looked at the first slate of nominees from karzai and did not like many of them. rejected them. the parliament did choose, did agree, and did confirm several of the most important cabinet choices from president karzai, minister of defence and minister of interior which handles all the police, minister of finance, minister of agriculture. one of the big recipients of assistance. so the cabinet in this area somewhat. president karzai has recently submitted a second slate to replace those that were rejected the first time. these are lesser-known people. the second slate of lesser-known peop
fighters, the karzai government has been working closely with general mcchrystal's staff under the leadership of a british major general to construct a plan offering incentives to low- and mid-level taliban fighters who are willing to lay down their weapon and recognize the afghan government's authority. president karzai has said that he will be ready to issue this plan within a month or so, and u.s. officials expect to be fully supportive. it will take a few months after that to make the plan operational. while there is apparently no progress to negotiate with higher level taliban to end the violence and become politically active, it doesn't reduce the need to chip away at that lower-level taliban group. we read in the press today that progress is being made. as a matter of fact, with leaders, local leaders in afghanistan in that endeavor. in conclusion, we saw some signs of progress on our visit in a number of critical ways, in training and equipping afghan security forces, in partnering closely in the field with the afghan security forces and a perception and reality of opti
an interim government in afganistan to be led by its interim president hamid karzai. despite the early success al qaeda's leadership was able to find a safe haven in pakistan's tribal areas. a few years later it gained enough strength to once again pose a serious threat to the u.s. meanwhile the taliban reestablished its headquarters in pakistan and gained enough strength as a result of inadequate afghanistan security forces. by last year the situation had grown so pa perilous that generl stanley mcchrystal issued a report stating that our failure to gain the initiative and reverse the momentum of the taliban within 12 months to make defeating the insurgency impossible. it was largely as a result of that assessment that the president agreed last year to send 30,000 more troops to afganistan. earlier this month i and some of my colleagues had the opportunity to visit afganistan and pakistan to assess the situation on the ground firsthand. among other things, we saw progress in the crucial southern provinces of kandahar. though in the early phases general crystal's -- mcchrystal's plan t
karzai and with his cabinet on numerous occasions, notably with the trip that hillary clinton and i had made to afghanistan on october 18 and 19 in conjunction with the inauguration. the afghans understood this, they are very comfortable with it. so i need to underscore that's what july 2011 means. not a withdraw, but the start of a responsibility transition in which american combat troops will begin to draw down. on the second question and in regard to pakistan, i'm not sure quite how you phrase it. strobe, you made a generic comment? >> mike hamlin and his colleagues have put together a set of bench marks on sort of how things are going. and the trend that they feel they have identified in pakistan is ominous, negative by comparison with a year ago. >> yeah. i read mike's monthly, it's quarterly, actually, isn't it? i read mike's quarterly table with great interest. and it helped -- influenced me a lot as we tried to develop our own benchmarks. but i think we have to be very careful about two things. maybe three things. one, let's not confuse input and output. it's a very common probl
that his concerns about president karzai are any different today? that anything has changed since -- >> again, i don't want to get into discussing those cables. i would simply say that at the conclusion of the election, the president had -- president obama had a conversation with president karzai. i think you heard the president speak clearly at west point and since then about the need to take governance seriously. that there was not an open-ended blank check for waste and abuse going forward in afghanistan. and the president and his team, and particularly ambassador eikenberry would be paying close attention. >> understanding your refusal to increase operations -- or to move to north waziristan to the north for a year and that was pretty clear on that strategy that there be something on that side of the border going on. >> let me see what i can get from d.o.d. for you. >> back to the state of the union. ask about the tone, are we going to see the president chastened by massachusetts or of the any developments of the past year? are we seeing a feisty defiant president kind of like
for the electoral process. it was a sickness can step. we are now watching closely as the karzai yet patrician and parliament put together the key ministers of the national government. we are going to continue our efforts in afghanistan but we also recognize, as the president outlined, we need to continue to move as rapidly as possible because clearly we want as i am sure the afghan people want to be able to see this transition where functions that may well be done today by the national community that we are building up the capacity for the government to be able to assume these responsibilities over the next couple of years. >> i have a question about a related country, and i would be human. haleh tomb are you to be anti-american, anti-western or antiforeign sentiment in yemen and do you have any concerns that those feelings would hinder or hurt your attempt to to help the yemenis government? >> well, i think we continue to look for ways in which we can support the yemeni government on military bases, civilian basis and economic basis and we are encouraged by the recent comments by the preside
Search Results 0 to 6 of about 7